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III. 
INTRODUCTION 
This is a case where a Highway Patrol Trooper with high 
amounts of prescription drugs in his system hit and killed Michael 
Kouris while Michael was crossing the street on his bike. Although 
eyewitness and expert testimony contradict the State's position, it 
asserts that there are no disputed facts. 
Additionally, the State mistakenly argues that this Court 
should not look beyond governmental immunity. However, if 
governmental immunity is not an absolute defense, the State has not 
contested that other duties exist such as a duty of reasonable care 
under the circumstances. 
Finally, in arguing its brief, the State asserted a number of 
errant technical points. These are addressed in a separate point 
at the end of this brief. 
IV. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
IF THERE ARE FACTS IN DISPUTE, THE COURT 
WILL NOT EVEN REACH THE IMMUNITY ISSUE 
The parties' briefs take opposite positions on the analytical 
approach to this case. Kourises7 opening brief argues that the 
analysis should begin by determining what duties apply. (Brief of 
Appellant at p.39-41.) On the other hand, the State's brief argues 
that the analysis should begin and end with immunity. (Brief of 
Appellee at p.11-14.) 
Kourises still vigorously contend that the Court should begin 
its analysis by addressing duty. (See POINT III below.) However, 
for purposes of this section (POINT I) Kourises will agree arguendo 
that the analysis should begin with immunity. 
Any argument on immunity begins with U.C.A. § 41-6-14 (1998) 
(see Exhibit A). Indeed, the State concedes that there can be no 
immunity if that section has been violated. (Brief of 
Defendants/Appellees at p. 15-22). But, whether or not there has 
been a violation of § 41-6-14 is a fact issue. Specifically, the 
State contends that there are no facts in dispute regarding 
violations of § 41-6-14 (Brief of Appellee at p.15-16). On the 
other hand, Kourises argue that there are several factual disputes 
regarding § 41-6-14. (See POINT II below.) The State argues that 
the analysis should begin with immunity. However, any analysis of 
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immunity must be based upon undisputed facts. If there are facts 
in dispute, the Court cannot opine about immunity and the case must 
be remanded. 
Yet, if the Court remands because there are conflicting facts, 
the duty/immunity issue would still remain back in the trial court. 
In other words, on remand, what were the Highway Patrol and Trooper 
Childs' duties and does immunity attach? Did Trooper Childs have 
a duty not to drive impaired? Did he have a duty not to pass at a 
crosswalk? Did he have a duty of reasonable care under the 
circumstances? 
In summary, Kourises urge this Court to reverse and remand 
because these are disputed issues of fact (see POINT II below.) 
However, even if this Court reverses and remands on the ground of 
disputed fact issues, Kourises urge this Court to instruct the 
trial court on the duty/immunity issues--thus avoiding another 
appeal and possibly another trial. 
POINT II 
THERE ARE KEY ISSUES OF DISPUTED FACT 
The State's brief relies on the trial court's list of "undisputed" 
facts. (Appellee's Memorandum at p. 15-16.) The State mistakenly 
asserts that these "undisputed facts" are indeed undisputed. The 
State also mistakenly asserts there are no other disputed facts. 
However, on summary judgment, a trial court cannot weigh 
disputed evidence. Bill Brown Realty Inc. v. Abbott, 562 P.2d 238, 
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239 (Utah 1978). If there is any dispute, those facts, and the 
inferences drawn must be interpreted in a light most favorable to 
Kourises. Blue Cross Blue Shield v. State, 779 P.2d 634, 636 (Utah 
1989). This section will demonstrate that there are several fact 
disputes. 
1. Trooper Childs7 Drug Impairment Can Be Established Even 
Without Expert Testimony. 
A central issue in this case is whether or not Trooper Childs 
was impaired by drugs at the time of the accident. Kourises 
relied, in part, on the expert testimony of Dr. Struempler. 
However, there are also documentary admissions, and factual 
evidence in the Record. (See Memorandum of Appellant at p. 6-9). 
The State's Memorandum challenges the expert testimony of Dr. 
Struempler (Appellee's Memorandum at p. 22-3 0) . However, the State 
has totally ignored the documentary admissions and factual evidence 
regarding Trooper Childs' drug impairment. 
Specifically, Trooper Childs had a long and documented history 
of prescription drug problems. He had been taking prescription 
narcotics for many years. R. 373. Because of its concern over his 
drug use, the Highway Patrol sent Trooper Childs for numerous 
medical exams. Appellant's Brief pg. 6-11. The result of many of 
those medical exams were findings that Trooper Childs was impaired 
and unsafe to drive. Id. Still, the Highway Patrol chose to 
ignore those medical recommendations that he be taken off the road. 
By the time of the Kouris accident, Trooper Childs was taking three 
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times the amount of the same medications that had impaired him at 
the time of those medical evaluations. Id. At the time of the 
Kouris accident, he had blood levels of those medications that far 
exceeded his prescribed dosage. Id. 
As a result of his history and continued problems, the Highway 
Patrol concluded: 
...Trooper Childs is not able to make the decision 
to rehabilitate from the prescribed medication in order 
to be able to drive safely...Because of his prescribed 
medication use, Trooper Childs i[s] not able to perform 
his functions as a field trooper with the Utah Highway 
Patrol. (R. 652, pg 3, 578). 
In short, even the Highway Patrol thought he was unsafe to drive 
because of the drugs! 
The State also ignores the facts from which a jury could 
conclude that Trooper Childs was impaired. For example, Trooper 
Childs intended to pass Tammy Auberger. She was approaching an 
intersection and was stopping at a crosswalk. He accelerated and 
passed her. Even assuming the State's version of the facts, 
Trooper Childs did not turn on any lights or signals until he had 
passed Auberger. R. 408, 411. His reaction was slow. An 
unimpaired driver would have turned lights on in ample time. 
Second, the other eyewitnesses clearly saw children in and 
around the crosswalk. R. 396, 398-403, 405. However, Trooper 
Childs did not see any. The unimpaired drivers (eyewitnesses) saw 
what the impaired driver did not. 
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Thus, the admission by the Highway Patrol; the extensive drug 
history; and Trooper Childs' lack of perception at the time of the 
accident are all facts from which a jury could conclude that 
Trooper Childs was impaired. Those facts should preclude summary 
j udgment. 
2. A Factual Dispute Exists With Regard to the Radio Call. 
The State argues that the dispatch call made prior to the 
accident made an emergency response appropriate. However, to meet 
the prerequisites of the statute, the call must be an emergency 
call and the Trooper must respond to the call as an emergency. See 
Appellant's Opening Brief pg. 29, §41-6-14 U.C.A. There are 
factual disputes as to both issues. 
In support of its contention that Trooper Childs' response was 
justified as an emergency, the State mischaracterizes testimony and 
relies on Trooper Childs' after the fact account. R. 187. 
The State argues that Kourises' own accident reconstruction 
expert testified that the call was an "emergency call." 
Even plaintiff's reconstruction expert, Ronald 
Probert (see R. 107), acknowledged that it was within 
Trooper Childs' discretion to respond to the situation 
as an emergency (R.2 84) . Not a shred of record evidence 
supports plaintiffs' contention that a genuine issue of 
material fact exists regarding the propriety of Trooper 
Childs' election to respond to the call as an emergency. 
Appellee's Brief pg. 18. 
Conveniently omitted from the State's summation of that 
evidence was Mr. Probert's opinion on the same page: 
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Q: If Cortland Childs's supervisor were to say that 
he believed this was a legitimate emergency response, 
would that affect your opinion? 
A: I read that. Sergeant Kelly. And again, it's an 
opinion. I guess I'm looking at this and saying, I don't 
see this as the emergency response that Cortland Childs 
did. R. 284 
Indeed, three pages earlier in the same deposition Mr. Probert 
testified: 
I don't think that - I've already said that. I don't 
think that in my classification I would look at this as 
an emergency. .. .He believed it was. And I think it was 
unreasonable. I don't think that that was correct. 
In addition to Probert's testimony and the testimony of 
Officer Allred discussed in Kourises' opening memo1, Trooper 
Childs' actions immediately before the accident conflict sharply 
with the statements he made after the accident. The State ignores 
Trooper Child's actions and looks only at his later, self-serving 
statement that he was responding to an emergency. 
Eyewitness testimony raises factual disputes as to whether the 
call was an emergency and whether Trooper Childs treated it as an 
emergency. Specifically, Trooper Childs heard the dispatch call 
while driving south on Highway 10, about a mile from where Michael 
was hit. R. 382, 385-86. He made a U-turn and began to head north 
(toward the intersection where Michael was hit) on Carbon Avenue 
1
 Due to a clerical error, a page of the deposition was 
omitted from appellants' opening brief. They are included here 
for full disclosure to the Court. See Exh. B. 
-7-
following directly behind Tammy Auberger. R.385-86. During that 
time, Ms. Auberger drove at the posted speed limit of 45 MPH. Id. 
About a quarter of a mile from the point of impact, the speed 
limit changed to 30 MPH. Ms. Auberger slowed to 30 MPH as did 
Trooper Childs behind her. At no point did Trooper Childs exceed 
the speed limit, attempt to pass her, or turn on any lights, 
sirens, or signal devices. R. 3 98. 
Finally, as Ms. Auberger approached the intersection, she 
began to stop to allow Michael to cross the street. R. 393. It was 
only as she was stopping that Trooper Childs sped up and pulled 
around her. Still, she saw no lights or sirens. R. 408, 411. 
Thus, after getting the call, Trooper Childs followed 
Ms. Auberger for approximately one mile. He followed at a normal 
distance while going the speed limit. He slowed when she slowed. 
He did not turn on any lights and appeared to be in no hurry 
whatsoever. Only when Ms. Auberger began to stop did Trooper 
Child's suddenly accelerate, swerve around her, and turn on his 
I 
lights. The accident happened a second or two later. 
Thus there are factual disputes as to whether this was an 
emergency and whether Trooper Childs treated the call as an 
emergency. Both factual question must be resolved in order to 
decide if governmental immunity applies. 
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3. A Factual Dispute Exists as to Where Michael Was at the Time 
of The Accident. 
The trial court concluded and the State argues that it is 
undisputed that Michael was outside the crosswalk when he was hit. 
The State also argues that Michael's location is immaterial. 
Appellee's Brief pg.19,20. However, Michael's location is material 
for at least two reasons and is disputed by eyewitness testimony. 
First, in its Memorandum Opinion, the trial court cited 
Michael's location as an undisputed fact. R. 612. It then granted 
summary judgment based on its opinion that Michael was outside the 
crosswalk. Thus, Michael's location is a material fact because the 
trial court thought it was material and based summary judgment 
thereon. 
Secondly, this is an intersection auto/pedestrian case. The 
central issues in nearly all automobile intersection cases center 
around time, speed, distance, visibility, etc. It seems axiomatic 
that the locations of the people involved are material. Each 
persons position in relation to one another is critical to the 
decision making process. A fact decided one way effects how the 
next fact fits in the puzzle. The location of the pedestrian and 
the vehicle are keystone facts. Here, the State cannot simply say 
that Trooper Childs' lights were on when Trooper Childs hit 
Michael, unless the State knows where Michael was. 
Finally, in addition to arguing that Michael's location is 
immaterial, the State argues that his location is undisputed. In 
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doing so, the State cites to an inadmissible police report and 
simply ignores conflicting eyewitness testimony. Appellee's Brief 
pg.19. The conflicting, eyewitness testimony, was that: 
...It made no sense that the police officer, with 
the kids crossing the crosswalk, would turn on his lights 
and speed off like that. R.363, 416, 548, 651 pg.2., 652 
pg. 4 6 (Emphasis added). 
4. There is a Factual Dispute as to Whether Trooper Childs7 
Lights Were On. 
The State argues as an undisputed fact that Trooper Childs 
activated his emergency lights before the accident. Actually, when 
he activated his lights is very much disputed. The State 
interprets the conflicting facts in a light most favorable to 
itself. Again, the State is not entitled to that viewpoint. Blue 
Cross at 636. 
Testimony by witness Tammy Auberger provides evidence that 
there were no lights on Trooper Childs car until he had passed her. 
R. 408. Id. This puts him past her car and in to the intersection. 
Yet, where exactly was Michael? Was he directly in the crosswalk? 
Was he in the unmarked crosswalk? 
These unknown questions are the precise reason why the 
disputed facts regarding Michael and Trooper Child's locations are 
critical. They create material issues of disputed fact as to 
whether or not Trooper Childs turned on his lights before the point 
of impact. 
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5. A Factual Dispute Exists as to Whether Trooper Childs Acted 
Reasonably. 
As argued in its opening brief, Kourises continue to assert 
that §41-6-14 contains a duty of reasonable care under the 
circumstances. Even if Trooper Childs turned his lights on a split 
second before he hit Michael, is he now immune? If this Court 
agrees that a duty of reasonable care exists, then even under the 
State's view of the facts, a dispute exists as to whether Trooper 
Childs acted reasonably.2 
POINT III 
THE COURT MUST ADDRESS THE ISSUE OF DUTY 
Kourises have argued in Point I above, that if there are 
disputed issues of fact, it will not be necessary for the Court to 
address immunity. However, regardless of the factual outcome, the 
Court must address duty. In other words, it is not possible to 
analyze Trooper Childs' and the Highway Patrol's immunity without 
first determining what duties apply. (See generally Brief of 
Appellant at p.33-38.) Again, the lower court erred by ruling on 
immunity without first determining the duty. (Id.) 
The State argues that it is not necessary to examine the issue 
of duty. Appellee's Brief pg.12. In support of this position, the 
State cites Ledfords v. Emery County School Dist., 849 P.2d 1162 
2
 The issue of whether or not Trooper Childs acted reasonably is 
related to the legal issue of Trooper Childs' duty. See POINT 
III below. 
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(Utah 1993). Id. There, the State quotes selectively from Ledfords 
stating that it would be improper to analyze duty first. 
In some of our past cases in which we analyzed such 
a claim against a governmental entity, we have begun with 
a traditional tort analysis to determine whether the 
plaintiff had alleged a legally cognizable duty and 
breach of duty. If the plaintiff had not stated a 
legally valid tort cause of action, we usually have 
declined to undertake the immunity analysis. At other 
times, we have performed the immunity analysis first, 
typically when it ended the inquiry. 
ie * * 
Whatever the order in which we address the 
questions, it is important to keep in mind that a 
legislative waiver of immunity is not a legislative 
consent to liability. Even when immunity is waived, 
there can be no liability absent a breach of a common law 
duty owed to the plaintiff. Appellee' s Brief pg. 13, 
quoting Ledfords at 1163-64. 
However, the State's analysis left out the next paragraph in 
the opinion which explains the Court's current position and its 
reasoning for not adhering to that position in Ledfords: 
In our more recent cases, we have tended to address the 
traditional tort questions first, for the sake of 
analytical clarity and of keeping distinct the questions 
of immunity and liability. However, in the present case, 
the parties have made it easy for us to decide whether to 
begin with immunity or duty. They did not brief the 
issue of [duty]...Ledfords at 1164, emphasis added. 
Here, the question of whether the Highway Patrol owed Kourises 
a duty has been before the court from the first summary judgment 
motion. 
In addition to §41-6-76, other statutes created a duty of 
care towards Michael. For example, the trooper was 
driving with drugs[] in his system, he passed a vehicle 
stopped at a crosswalk, and he failed to take reasonable 
precautions for people in the crosswalk. In each 
instance there are Utah statutes that create a specific 
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duty of care that runs from the Trooper to the 
pedestrian... 
In addition to specific State statutes cited above, 
the Highway Patrol's own internal policy for responding 
to emergency calls creates an even higher duty of care... 
R. 365-366 (footnotes and citations omitted). 
Kourises extensively argued to the trial court that there were 
duties from which the Highway Patrol and the State are not immune. 
Id., R. 547-550, R.592-93, R.561 pg.20, etc. Moreover, these duty 
arguments were a major theme of Kourises' brief before this Court. 
Appellants' brief pg.33-41. In summary, the issue of duty was 
plainly argued below and extensively briefed to this Court. It is 
necessary that the duties be determined before looking at immunity. 
POINT IV 
TROOPER CHILDS' DRUG USE PRECLUDES SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
A. The Trial Court Abused its Discretion When Ruling on 
Struempler's Opinion Testimony. 
The trial court erred in excluding Struempler's affidavit 
because it applied the wrong law. The trial court's Memorandum 
Decision and the State's brief all argue the same point: an expert 
must be a medical doctor (or have the training and experience of a 
medical doctor) in order to opine whether a person is impaired. 
Appellee's Brief pg. 25. Neither here nor below did the State or 
the trial court ever look at Mr. Struempler's qualifications, 
education, or experience. 
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In support of its position, the State attempts to distinguish 
the controlling Utah authority, State v. Mason, 530 P.2d 795 (Utah 
1975). Mason stands for the proposition that a person need not be 
a medical doctor in order to testify to the impairing effect of 
drugs. Yet, the State argues that Struempler's testimony goes to 
liability whereas the expert testimony in Mason went to testimonial 
capacity. Although the State's argument raises a possible 
distinguishing element, the difference here is immaterial. 
In Mason, as well as here, the issue is whether the proposed 
expert is qualified to testify to the impairing effect of a drug, 
not what element of a claim the testimony goes to. Id. at 795, 798. 
The Mason Court correctly looked at the experts' qualifications and 
ruled that a police officer could testify as an expert on the issue 
of impairment. Id. Mason stands for the proposition that in Utah, 
one does not need to be a medical doctor to testify to the 
impairing effect of a drug. 
The State also attempts to distinguish Roberts v. United 
States, 316 F.2d 489 (3rd Cir. 1963). The State argues that the 
Roberts expert had extensive training and experience in the field 
of toxicology and two years of scientific work in a medical school. 
Id at 493. It then argues that the present case is different 
because Struempler had no medical training whatsoever. Appellee's 
Brief at pg.28. 
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In reality, the State's argument supports Kourises' position. 
The Roberts expert had two years of scientific work in a medical 
school. However, similar to the State's arguments, the Roberts 
expert did not have medical training. Yet here, Struempler not 
only has extensive training and clinical experience in chemistry 
and toxicology, he spent time teaching doctors in a medical school 
and for the United States Navy. R. 307-311. 
Finally, the State attempts to distinguish State v. Piatt, 496 
S.W.2d 878 (Mo. App. 1973). The State argues: 
...the challenged expert testimony was held inadmissible 
for lack of materiality. Consequently, any statement 
addressing the issue of its admissibility on other 
grounds is merely dictum. Appellee's Brief pg. 28. 
Here, the State has failed to disclose to the Court the 
pertinent part of the Piatt case. The Piatt court stated: 
A ruling on this evidentiary point is not necessary for 
the disposition of the present appeal, but will be 
considered nevertheless, for the guidance of counsel and 
the trial court in connection with retrial. The 
objection made at trial, that the witness was not 
qualified to answer the question as an expert witness, is 
without merit. A qualified chemist, particularly one 
trained in toxicology, is competent to testify as to the 
effect of drugs upon the human body, (citations omitted). 
Id. at 884. (Emphasis added). 
This is not dictum. Contrary to the State's implication, this court 
is instructing its trial court on the law. 
Yet in the present case, the trial court simply concluded that 
because Mr. Struempler was not a medical doctor, he was 
automatically disqualified: 
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...The Motion to Strike should be granted for the reasons 
set forth therein3, namely that because Richard 
Struempler is not a medical doctor he is unqualified to 
render the opinion stated in his affidavit that Trooper 
[Childs] was impaired at the time of the collision. . . . R. 
610. 
The trial court ignored the fact that Mr. Struempler taught medical 
doctors at George Washington School of Medicine, and, for the U.S. 
Navy R. 307-311; it ignored the fact that he has published numerous 
articles on drugs, impairment, and drug metabolites Id. ; it ignored 
the fact that as an expert witness for the United States Navy, he 
has been qualified in over a hundred cases to testify to similar 
issues in state and federal courts Id.; and, it ignored the fact 
that as a clinical chemist with training in toxicology, his job for 
over twenty five years has been dealing with drugs in people and 
how those drugs effect them. 
B. Struempler's Opinion was not Speculative. 
The State also argues that Mr. Struempler's opinion was 
speculative. Appellee's Brief pg. 2 6-27. This argument was not 
preserved below and should not be considered. Julian v. State, 966 
P.2d 249, 258 (Utah 1998). Nevertheless, a review of Struempler's 
entire affidavit shows his opinion was not speculation. In the 
3
 The Utah Court of Appeals has recently held that granting a 
motion for reasons set forth in a supporting memorandum is 
insufficient. Gabriel v. Salt Lake City Corp., 34 P.3d 234 (Ut. 
App. 2001). It held that the presumption of correctness 
ordinarily afforded trial court rulings has little operative 
effect when [the court] cannot divine the trial court's reasoning 
because of a cryptic ruling. Id. citing Allen v. Prudential 83 9 
P.2d 798, 800 (Utah 1992). 
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affidavit, Mr. Struempler discusses the materials he reviewed, his 
findings, what the literature says about the drugs, and then offers 
his opinion. R. 304-306. Mr. Struempler's opinion was clear and 
unequivocal: 
fl2 . In my opinion, Mr. Childs was impaired by use 
of these medications at the time of the motor vehicle 
accident on 7/19/98. R. 306. 
C. Medical Malpractice Cases are Not Applicable. 
In its brief, the State argues that it has offered substantial 
authority for the proposition that only a medical doctor may 
testify to impairment. The State's cases are incorporated by 
reference to arguments it made to the trial court. There, the 
State presented a series of medical malpractice cases: Fitz v. 
Synthes Inc., 990 P.2d 391 (Utah 1999), Fredericksen v. Maw, 227 
P.2d 772 (Utah 1951), Chadwick v. Nielsen, 763 P.2d 817 (Utah App. 
1988), Kent v. Pioneer Valley Hospital, 930 P.2d 904 (Utah App. 
1997), Dikeou v. Osborn, 881 P.2d 943 (Utah App. 1994). 
The State cited these as support for the proposition that 
expert medical testimony is required to establish medical 
causation. It argues that because Struempler is not a medical 
doctor he cannot testify that Trooper Childs' use of drugs "caused" 
the accident. This argument is misplaced because impairment and 
medical causation are completely different concepts. 
The cases referred to by the State are all medical malpractice 
or medical device injury cases. In that realm, the issue of 
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medical causation is an essential element of the medical cause of 
action: Did the breach of the medical standard of care (or the 
faulty medical device) cause the injuries claimed? Typically, 
there must be expert medical testimony on this issue because the 
necessary knowledge is beyond that of the average jurors. 
The present case is significantly different. The question 
before the court was impairment, not medical causation. As argued 
above, drug induced impairment can be established by non-medical 
expert testimony. 
However, the State has offered no support whatsoever for its 
proposition that where there is an alleged impairment, the 
causation of a car accident must be established by expert medical 
testimony. There is no such requirement in Utah because in most 
cases a jury can look at the evidence and come to its own 
conclusion as to whether the impairment contributed to the crash. 
Thus, the cases cited by the State do not support the trial court's 
conclusion that Kouris must have expert medicail causation 
testimony. 
D. Driving With Controlled Substances in the Blood is Prohibited 
Regardless of Impairment. 
Utah Code §41-6-44.6 prevents anyone from driving a car if 
they have a controlled substance in their blood. The legislature 
passed this statute because of the inherent dangers of driving 
while under the influence of a controlled substance, whether or not 
one is visibly impaired. See Utah Code Annotated §41-6-44.6. 
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Yet, the State argues that all drug testimony is inadmissible 
because there is no evidence of impairment. Appellee's Brief 
pg. 29. However, the question of impairment under 41-6-44.6 is 
irrelevant because it is not an element of the statute. Thus, it 
is unlawful for one to drive with a controlled substance in their 
blood, even if unimpaired. 
Ironically, the Highway Patrol is the agency charged with 
enforcing this statute. It was the Highway Patrol's responsibility 
to protect Michael from drivers with controlled substances in their 
blood. It was the Highway Patrol that allowed Trooper Childs to 
drive with controlled substances in his blood. R. 377. The Highway 
Patrol knowingly let Trooper Childs drive for years when some of 
its own doctors warned that it was dangerous and recommended he not 
be allowed to drive. R. 559. 
The State specifically knew he had a drug problem. It hired 
doctors that said he was impaired and that he displayed drug 
seeking behavior. The Highway Patrol instructed Trooper Childs' 
supervisors not to ask about, question, or discuss his drug 
problem. R. 377. Finally, a few months after Michael's death, 
when Trooper Childs nearly killed a fellow officer, the Highway 
Patrol finally took him off the road. It concluded he was unsafe 
to drive because of his drug use. R. 578, 652 pg. 3. 
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POINT V 
THE STATE'S TECHNICAL ARGUMENTS ARE UNFOUNDED 
Throughout the State's brief, it raised a number of issues 
that address technicalities as opposed to the substance of 
Kourises' arguments. Moreover, for the most part, these technical 
arguments arise from the States incomplete review of the record. In 
order to keep the preceding substantive replies concise, Kourises 
have addressed the State's technical arguments here under a single 
heading. 
1. The Complaint Adequately Covers All of Kourises' Causes of 
Action. 
The State asserts that the Kourises have re-characterized 
their claims from a negligence claim to a negligent supervision 
claim. Appellee's Brief p.10. 
On December 28, 1998, Kourises filed a negligence and wrongful 
death complaint against the Utah Highway Patrol, the State of Utah, 
and Cortland Childs. R.l. The complaint sought a judgment against 
each defendant. R.5. It sought a judgment against Cortland Childs 
for his negligence. Separately, under the doctrine of vicarious 
liability, it sought a judgment against the Highway Patrol and the 
State of Utah for the negligence of their employee while in the 
course and scope of his employment. R. 3-5. 
Based on early discovery of the narcotic medications in 
Trooper Childs' system, and his long and significant drug history 
while an employee of the Highway Patrol, Kourises filed an amended 
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complaint adding a cause of action against the Highway Patrol for 
negligent hiring, training, and supervision, as well as a cause of 
action for violation of Kourises' civil rights. R. 62-68. 
The State filed several summary judgment motions including one 
opposing the individual claim against Cortland Childs. R. 115, 138. 
The State's trial counsel argued that the governmental immunity act 
immunized state employees from individual liability while acting in 
the course and scope of their employment. R.13 8-39. To simplify 
the issues, Kourises agreed to dismiss the individual claim 
purporting to hold Trooper Childs personally liable. R. 651 at 
pg.9. 
The vicarious liability claims against the Highway Patrol and 
the State for Trooper Childs' negligence as an employee, were never 
dismissed. This is clear not only from the procedural history of 
the case, but also from the oral arguments that followed the 
dismissal of the individual claim. 
...Well we're down to, urn, a negligent supervision 
claim and [] negligence claim, Your Honor, at this 
point, cause the civil rights claims have gone away 
and the individual claims against Trooper Childs 
have gone away...Sandra Steinvoort, Defendants' 
Trial Counsel, R. 652 p.5. (See also R. 651 pp.9-
25. 
This case still contains a negligence/wrongful death claim 
against the State and the Highway Patrol for the negligence of its 
employee Trooper Childs. It also contains a negligent supervision 
claim against the State and the Highway Patrol. R.62 
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2 . Statutory Construction was Extensively Argued Below. 
The State argues that the Kourises' statutory construction 
argument was not preserved below. Appellee's Brief p.14. However, 
it was preserved in the Plaintiff's Memorandum in Opposition to 
Summary Judgment. R. 360-369. Additionally, it was preserved at 
oral argument in lengthy argument from both sides over the precise 
issue. R. 652 pp.25-48. 
3. Michael's Disputed Location at Impact was Argued Below. 
The State argues that Kourises did not raise below that 
Michael was in the crosswalk. Thus, it contends that Kourises 
cannot raise that issue here. Appellee's Brief p. 19, 20. That 
argument is without merit. The following testimony was argued 
extensively in Kourises' pleadings below and at oral arguments: 
...It made no sense that the police officer, with the 
kids crossing the crosswalk, would turn on his lights and 
speed off like that. R.363, 416, 548, 651 pg.2., 652 pg.46 
(Emphasis added). 
4. Kourises' Statutory Construction Argument is Proper. 
As argued in Point III, a central issue in this case has 
always been what duties existed and whether immunity attaches. 
Kourises propounded a line of reasoning based on statutory 
construction. The State argued in reply that statutory 
construction is not relevant because the trial court ruled immunity 
was a complete defense; and, that the statutory construction was 
not preserved below. Appellee's Brief pg. 13-14. 
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On review of a Summary Judgment, an appellate court accords no 
deference to a trial court's legal conclusions given to support the 
grant of summary judgment and reviews those conclusions for 
correctness. Schurtz v. B.M.W. of N. America, 814 P.2d 1108, 1111-
1112 (Utah 1991) . Thus, it is irrelevant that the trial court 
found immunity to be a complete defense. This Court can analyze 
the statutes to determine whether the trial court was correct. 
Additionally, the statutory construction issue was preserved 
below. Appellant's Openincr Brief pg. 1-2. A central issue has 
always been what Utah motor vehicle statues and common-laws impose 
duties on the State. In order to determine whether a statute 
creates a duty or confers immunity, one must construe the 
applicable statutes. The trial court had to do this in order to 
come to its conclusion that immunity attached. This Court is free 
to use principles of statutory construction here. 
5. The State Improperly Alludes to the Contents of a Video. 
The State alludes to a video of the accident, in support of 
several of its arguments. Appellee's Brief pg. 19. There was 
video footage captured by a nearby gas station's video surveillance 
system. However, the quality of the video is at best, extremely 
poor. Had this video been in anyway illuminating, it would have 
been part of the Record in this case. It is not. The video reveals 
almost nothing, and it was never offered in evidence. Moreover, 
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the State does not even cite to portions of the video, it cites to 
its trial counsel's interpretation of the video. Id. 
6. Dr. Bender's Affidavit is Properly Before the Court. 
The State argues that Dr. Bender's affidavit is ineffective 
because it is not signed or notarized. However, the affidavit 
before the court is proper. See Exh. C. 
Kourises have no explanation why the original signed affidavit 
does not appear in the Record. It was filed with the trial court 
and hand delivered to the Attorney General. The affidavit and its 
contents were argued at oral arguments on the Motion to Reconsider. 
R. 653. Neither the trial court nor the State raised any 
objections because both had a signed copy in their possession. 
Therefore, since the trial court reviewed and made legal rulings on 
Dr. Bender's signed affidavit; and, no objections were raised 
below, it is properly before this Court. 
V. 
CONCLUSION 
In its decision granting Summary Judgment, the trial court 
made several errors which require that the Summary Judgment be 
reversed. The trial court improperly weighed or ignored evidence 
on impairment, the emergency vehicle statute, and on the accident 
itself. An additional critical piece of evidence was Richard 
Struempler's expert opinion that Trooper Childs was impaired. The 
trial court abused its discretion by excluding this testimony 
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because Struempler was not a medical doctor. Based on the disputed 
facts and the impairment evidence, there can be no immunity. 
However, even if the facts are undisputed, Trooper Childs 
violated duties for which there is no immunity. These duties 
include a duty of care under the circumstances; a duty not to drive 
while impaired or with a controlled substance in ones body; a duty 
not to pass a car at a crosswalk; and, a heightened duty of care 
with children present. The State appears to have conceded these 
duties. 
Therefore, the Kourises submit that this Court should remand 
this case for a trial of the facts with the testimony of Richard 
Struempler. So as to avoid further appeals, Kourises respectfully 
suggest that this Court instruct the parties on the issues of duty 
and governmental immunity. 
DATED this / day of y ¥ I OjlCK^ , 2002. 
ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES 
Attorneys for AppeU3£its 
WARREN W. DRIGGS 
J. BRADFORD DeBRY 
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VI. 
ADDENDUM 
1. EXHIBIT A P a 9 e 1 
2. EXHIBIT B Pages 2-3 
3. EXHIBIT C Pages 4-7 
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Tab A 
EXHIBIT A 
41-6-14 (1998) states as follows: 
(1) The operator of an authorized 
emergency vehicle, when responding to an 
emergency call or when in the pursuit of an 
actual or suspected violator of the law or 
when responding to but not upon returning 
from a fire alarm, may exercise the 
privileges under this section, subject to 
Subsections (2) through (4). 
(2) The operator of an authorized 
emergency vehicle may: 
(A) park or stand, irrespective of the 
provisions of this chapter; 
(B) proceed past a red or stop signal or 
stop sign, but only after slowing down 
as may be necessary for safe operation; 
(C) exceed the maximum speed limits; or 
(D) disregard regulations governing 
direction or movement or turning in 
specified directions. 
(3) Privileges granted under this 
section to the operator of an authorized 
emergency vehicle, who is not involved in a 
vehicle pursuit, apply only when the operator 
of the vehicle sounds an audible signal under 
Section 41-6-146, or uses a visual signal as 
defined under Section 41-6-132, which is 
visible from in front of the vehicle. 
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A P P E A R A N C E S 
FOR PLAINTIFFS: Mr. Warren W. Driggs 
ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES 
4252 South 700 East 
Salt Lake City, UT 84107 
FOR DEFENDANT: Mr. J. Wesley Robinson 
Assistant Attorney General 
3 60 East 300 South, #600 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Tuesday, December 21, 1999: 1,1:15 a.m. 
TRACY ALLRED, 
called as a witness, having been first 
duly sworn, was examined and testified as follows: 
EXAMINATION 
BY MR. DRIGGS: 
Q. Mr. Allred, will you please state your 
name for the record? 
A. My name is Tracy Allred. 
Q. And how old are you, sir? 
A. ITm 41 years old. 
Q. And where do you work? 
A. I'm a patrol officer with the Price 
16 City Police Department 
17 Q. How long have you been employed as a 
18 patrol officer with Price City? 
19 A. A little over ten years. 
20 Q. And before that what did you do? 
21 A. I was a patrol officer with the Helper 
22 City Police Department. 
23 Q. For what period of time? 
24 A. Three years and four months. 
A~A U~C f^r ihf* Pltv 
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1 if you are notified over your radio that someone is 
2 breaking the law and you're asked to go check it 
3 out, would that be pursuit? 
4 A. No. 
5 Q. Why not? 
6 A. A vehicle pursuit would be when I'm 
7 following someone, trying to get them to pull 
8 over. That would be just a response call. 
9 Q. Okay. A response call. Is a response 
10 call an emergency? 
11 A. It depends on the call. 
12 Q. Okay. 
13 A. A family fight would be a Code 3 
14 emergency call. You might get an accident and 
15 that 's a Code 1 call, where you just respond 
16 normally. Get there when you get there. 
17 Q. Okay. You don't know what this call 
18 was that he got? You don't know what level of 
19 emergency or response? 
20 A. What I heard it over the radio, to me 
21 that 's just a violator call. 
22 Q. Did you hear it over the radio? 
|23 A. Yes, 1 did. 
24 Q. Did you hear this very thing over the 
|25 radio? 
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1 A. Yes, 1 did. 
2 Q. Okay. And what did you hear? 
3 A. Well, 29 Alpha 11 was going up Carbon 
4 Avenue — and I put this together through the 
5 conversations -- and 1 notified dispatch that there 
6 was a kid holding the tmnk closed, they were going 
7 north on Carbon Avenue, gave a location, and 
8 Sgt Drolc asked where I was; I was at K-Mart. 
9 Q. Where was St. Drolc? 
10 A. I don't know. 
11 Q. Was he in his car? 
12 A. Oh, he was in his patrol car, yes. 
13 Q. So when you heard Jeremiah Davies call 
14 to dispatch--
\l5 A. He was on his hand-held. 
116 Q. Okay. He called into dispatch and 
17 that's what you heard? 
18 A. That's correct. 
19 Q. And you heard him describe a child in a 
20 trunk trying to hold the lid down? 
21 A. That's correct. 
22 Q. Okay. And then what? 
23 A. Then I started that way, Sgt. Drolc 
24 asked me how close I was, and I said, hey, I 'm at 
25 600 West, Second South, I'm a ways out. So it 
Ptge^i 
1 started that way. 
2 Q. Did you put on your siren? 
3 A. No. 
4 Q. Did you put on your lights? 
| 5 A. No. 
| 6 Q. Did you consider is it to be an 
7 emergency? 
8 A. No, I didn't. I was out, it was 
9 ineffective, it wouldn't matter if put my lights on 
10 and siren, I would have been ineffective anyway. 
11 It would have been by. So I just tried to get 
12 there as fast as I could. 
13 Q. Did you exceed the speed limit on your 
14 way? 
15 A. Not that I recall. 
16 Q. You didn't really regard that to be an 
17 emergency? 
18 A. Well, I tried to get there as soon as I 
19 could, but at the same time I didn't activate my 
20 overhead lights or anything like that. 
21 Q. Okay. You didn't think that was 
22 necessary? 
23 A. Not from where 1 was coming from. 
24 Q. Did you ever hear Cortland Childs's 
25 response to the thing that you heard? 
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1 A. Yes, I did. 
2 Q. What did he say? 
3 A. He said, "I'm on Carbon Avenue, I'll go 
4 ahead and see if I can't catch up to it." 
5 Q. Okay. Is that what he said, or is that 
6 the gist of what he said? 
7 A. Something like that, yes. I can't 
8 remember his exact words. 
9 Q. Okay. Then what's the next thing you 
10 heard? 
11 A. Just the 10-33 call that he gave. 
12 Q. Okay. Was that — let me back up. Was 
13 that call that you heard describing a kid in the 
14 trunk, was that on Channel 3 or was that — do you 
15 know? 
16 A. 1 can't remember. 
17 Q. Okay. 
18 A. I believe the first conversation 
19 between Jeremiah and the dispatcher was on 
20 Channel 4. 
21 Q. So that initial conversation, Jeremiah 
22 Davies is describing the child in the trunk? 
23 A. That's correct. 
24 Q. After that communication, you hear 
25 Cortland Childs say, "I'm close, I'll check it 
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ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES 
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) AFFIDAVIT OF JOHN BENDER, M.D. 
) Civil No. 980700823 PI 
) Judge Bruce K. Halliday 
STATE OF COLORADO ) 
. ) SS: 
COUNTY OF yv^-^au^^ 
COMES NOW, JOHN BENDER, M.D., and having first been duly 
sworn under oath states and asserts as follows: 
1. I am a licensed physician in the State of Utah. I 
have practiced medicine for 38 years. From approximately 1972 
through 1997 my specialty was physical medicine and rehabilitation. 
I served as the medical director for Stewart Rehabilitation at 
McKay-Dee Hospital in Ogden, Utah. I have also served as medical 
director of Western Rehabilitation Institute in Sandy, Utah (now 
referred to as HealthSouth Rehabilitation Center). I have also 
worked at Holy Cross/St. Benedict's Hospitals in both Salt Lake and 
Ogden. My specialty was chronic pain management. I am very 
familiar with issues surrounding medication use for pain 
management. I believe I am uniquely qualified through my 
education, training, and experience to address the issues and 
opinions raised in this Affidavit. 
2. I personally performed a medical evaluation of 
Trooper Cortland Childs on November 12, 1991. I generated a report 
on that date as a result of that interview and examination. I also 
prepared two follow-up letters. My initial report and follow-up 
letters are attached as Exhibit B. 
3. In addition to my medical examination, I have 
reviewed the medical records of Trooper Childs generated by 
physicians and other medical personnel from approximately 1991 
through 1999. Included in those records were, among other things, 
summaries of Trooper Childs' prescription drug history during that 
period of time. 
4. I have also reviewed the toxicology reports that 
were generated shortly after the Kouris accident. 
5. I have also reviewed Trooper Childs' personnel file 
which includes, among other things, correspondence, memoranda, and 
reports commenting on his drug use, disability, and potential 
impairment from drug use while on the job. 
6. Based upon my experience, education, training, 
medical examination, and a review of the aforementioned documents, 
I can offer the following opinions: 
2 
a. At the time of my examination, Mr. Childs was 
impaired by virtue of his narcotic prescription drug use. It 
was my opinion at that time that he should not drive a patrol 
car, unless and until he was weaned from the drugs he was 
taking. 
b. It appears from the records I have reviewed 
that, since my examination, Trooper Childs was not weaned from 
his narcotic prescription drug use. In fact, at the time of 
the Kouris accident, it appears he was taking nearly three 
times the amount of controlled narcotic medications than he 
was taking at the time of my previous examination. 
c. Trooper Childs' regimen for use of narcotic 
pain medications was inconsistent with accepted practices of 
long-term pain management through the use of narcotic 
medication. 
d. It appears from his personnel file that, in the 
year or two before the Kouris accident, he demonstrated 
erratic behavior, and was involved in other motor vehicle 
accidents (or near accidents) where, by his own admission, his 
judgment was impaired. It is my opinion that these incidents 
were consistent with a person who is addicted to prescription 
medication and impaired by its effects. 
e. I have reviewed the Affidavit of Richard 
Struempler, a toxicologist hired by the Kouris family. I 
agree with the statements and conclusions he made in that 
3 
Affidavit. Moreover, I believe he is qualified to address 
issues concerning the amount of controlled substances in the 
body and its relationship to prescribed dosages. 
f. To a reasonable degree of medical certainty, I 
believe Trooper Childs was impaired by the use of narcotic 
medications at the time that his car struck and killed Michael 
Kouris. 
DATED this ft dL day of (^  c X ^ U v , 2000. 
LzJL ^ ^ ^ W . ^ ^H 
JOHNP BENDER, M.D. 
O^- Subscribed and sworn to before me this /y day of , 2000. 
NOTARY PUBK5*T>C~ "" 
Residing at \/7o/ f. £ r^ J~/, 
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